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CURRENT ISSUES IN CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAW* 
BY ELAINE R. JONES" 
Thank you very, very much, Judge Henderson. What a 
generous, thorough introduction. With my graduation dates 
everyone can do the math and figure out just how old this 
woman is. It chronicled my experiences at the bar and else-
where, and I do appreciate Judge Henderson's taking the time 
to explain to you who I' am. 
I want to thank you for inviting me to be with you today. 
In particular, I want to express my appreciation to Dean 
Pagano, to Professors Jon Sylvester and David Oppenheimer, 
the faculty organizers of the series, and to the Golden Gate 
Black Law Students Association and the Bar Association of 
San Francisco, the organizational co-sponsors of these impor-
tant discussions. 
Judge Henderson explained to you just what the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund (LDF) is. We are a nation-wide civil rights 
law firm, headquartered in New York City, with offices in Los 
Angeles and Washington, D.C. as well. Founded by Thurgood 
Marshall in 1940, we were the first public interest law firm in 
the country. Thurgood had been general counsel of the NAACP 
and decided that there should be a separate organization to 
pursue the legal campaign against segregation and other forms 
of racism. An organization separate in law, separate in fact, 
separately incorporated, that could also have tax exempt status 
* Delivered March 14, 1996 at Golden Gate University. 
** DIRECTOR-COUNSEL, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FuND, INc.; 
BA 1965, HOWARD UNIVERSITY; JD 1970, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA. 
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as a non-profit organization. The NAACP gave permission to 
use its initials, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was born. 
LDF has had a 56-year history, and we have been involved in 
more cases in the U.S. Supreme Court than any other legal 
organization in the country with the exception of the Solicitor 
General of the United States. At last count, we had participat-
ed in over 500 cases in the Court. 
There's a lot of confusion, because when people hear the 
name NAACP Legal Defense Fund they make several assump-
tions. First, they assume that we are part of the NAACP. Sec-
ond, they assume that we represent only African Americans. 
Third, they assume that the cases that we bring are limited to . 
issues of race. However, all three assumptions are wrong. 
As I've told you, we're not part of the NAACP; we're sepa-
rate. When we first were incorporated we had interlocking 
boards. But when Brown v. Board of Education 1 was decided 
in 1954, Southern congressmen - many of whom spoke with 
this same twang with which I do - wrote to the Internal Rev-
enue Service complaining there was an organization out there 
enjoying tax exempt status that had an interlocking board with 
an organization that did not. So in 1956 we had to sever the 
boards and thus became completely separate, not only separate 
in law as we had been before, but separate in fact as well. 
Charitable contributions are a critical source of our fund-
ing, as are counsel fees. Unfortunately, we can no longer rely 
on counsel fees the way we once did. Historically, we initiated 
civil rights litigation as plaintiffs, thus entitling us - if we 
won - to recover attorney's fees under the fee-shifting provi-
sions of the federal civil rights laws; However, increasingly -
and particularly in the areas of affirmative action and voting 
rights - we find ourselves forced to intervene as defendants in 
order to fight to save programs or districting plans that are 
under attack by the right. One of the many unfortunate conse-
quences of that defensive posture is that even when we win, 
we cannot recover attorney's fees. This change in posture has 
serious economic consequences for civil rights groups like our-
1. 347 U.s. 483 (1954). 
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selves. 
Now, the second issue I mentioned - whether we repre-
sent only African Americans - is interesting. The first Title 
VII case that the Legal Defense Fund litigated in the High 
Court - in fact, the first case under Title VII decided by the 
Supreme Court - was actually a sex discrimination case: Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta2 in 1971. A white woman from Atlanta, 
Georgia, with three preschool-aged kids applied for a job with 
the Martin Marietta Corporation. Martin Marietta said, "You 
have three preschool-aged children, you should be at home, not 
in the work place." We laugh at it now but companies did that 
all the time before Title VII was enacted. Employers had the 
right to do that - there was nothing that limited them. LDF 
took that case, and I asked Mrs. Phillips why she had come to 
us. And she said it w'as because we understood civil rights and 
that she was hoping we would agree to represent her. And so 
we did. And in a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed the 
ruling of the trial court that had dismissed her case. That was 
the first Title VII case. And so the race of the plaintiff does not 
determine whether the Legal Defense Fund becomes involved 
in a case. It's the issue that the case presents in terms of pro-
tecting the integrity of the law. 
And the third assumption - that our cases are limited to 
issues of race - is similarly wrong. Not only was our first 
Title VII victory in the Supreme Court won in a case that did 
not involve race, but our most recent one was as well. Just last 
year a case came to us from Tennessee: McKennon v. Nashville 
Banner.s It concerned the "after-acquired evidence" doctrine. 
Two courts below had ruled. The plaintiffs lawyer had lost 
both in the district court and in the Sixth Circuit. The plaintiff 
was a white female, 62 years old, who had sued under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. She had been dismissed. 
She alleged it was because of age. Her lawyer brought the 
lawsuit and during the course of discovery it was disclosed that 
she had taken some documents home from work, which was 
strictly prohibited under the company rules and was grounds 
for dismissal. So when it came to light that she had taken 
2. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
3. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). 
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those documents home, the company said, "Well, even if we 
dismissed her unlawfully - although we do not admit that by 
any means - it was negated by her subsequent unlawful act, 
since she would have been fired anyway had we known about 
the documents." And the courts below had accepted this argu-
ment and had held that such after-acquired evidence could 
negate her age claim. Her lawyer came to us, LDF, and asked 
if we would take the case to the Supreme Court. 
Now the mischief of a rule like that - which may not be 
obvious - is that it would allow any employer who has dis-
criminated to escape liability, by digging through an 
employee's record and finding some infraction to justify its 
action retroactively. It would make bringing such a case very 
unappealing to an employee - even when it is clear that the 
employer had acted for discriminatory reasons, and it would 
allow employers to get away with a lot of discrimination. 
Returning to the McKennon case, when she came to us, we 
took the case to the High Court, drafting the certiorari petition 
in a way that we hoped would intrigue the Court and lead it to 
see the importance of the issue. Once cert was granted, we 
brought the lawyer up to New York and spent time really 
mooting him because arguing in the district court and arguing 
in the court of appeals are quite different from standing up 
before the High Court. You stand up and they're right there in 
your face, and you've got to be able to get in and out of that 
argument, especially with Justices on the bench who are bound 
and determined to eat up your time. They're not going to vote 
for you, but you've got thirty minutes and they want to make 
sure that they use up 15 or 20 of them. So, you've got to know 
how to get in and out of the argument. There's a whole argu-
ment strategy you have to understand for the High Court. So, 
we moot-courted him several times, got him ready, and we 
second-chaired him at the argument. 
We decided to take the case because of the interrelation-
ship of the issues. Age, disability, gender, race and ethnicity -
those are sister statutes and if you let a doctrine such as the 
after-acquired evidence rule seep into the law in an age case, 
we're going to look up and find it in race; it's going to be in 
gender; it's going to be there in disability cases as well. Some-
4
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times you bring a gender or a race claim to the High Court and 
you have trouble getting through so that the Justices can real-
ly hear the issues that you're raising. Sometimes a race or 
gender claim can cloud the Court's understanding of what's 
going on. But I thought one thing they would understand is 
age. And they did. We won that case by a nine to zero vote. 
It's interesting - when the case came down and the Wall 
Street Journal did their piece on McKennon v. Nashville Ban-
ner, they went right away to the Women's Legal Defense Fund. 
Because the plaintiff was a white woman, they assumed that 
the Women's Legal Defense Fund had represented her. But, it 
was the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (although that didn't stop 
the head of the Women's LDF, my friend Judith Lichtman, 
from obligingly providing the quote that was used in the story). 
Let me share another example of this interrelationship 
and how we ought to be brought together by these issues rath-
er than divided by them. LDF went to the Ford Foundation 
and got the first grant that gave birth to the Mexican-Ameri-
can Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). And the 
LDF Director-Counsels, beginning with Jack Greenberg and 
continuing with Julius Chambers and then myself, have all 
served on MALDEF's board. Interrelationships and solidarity 
are important. In New York you will find many of the legal 
defense funds in the same building. Several public interest law 
groups came together, got a building in New York, and worked 
out a consortium arrangement. That building, 99 Hudson 
Street, is now home to the Asian-American Legal Defense 
Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, the NOW Legal 
Defense Fund, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. One bomb 
takes care of us all, but we're all right there. 
Another illustration of how these issues are inclusive and 
not exclusive brings to mind a case that walked into our Wash-
ington, D.C. office a few years ago. The plaintiff was a white 
male manager of a chain of restaurants in Maryland. And the 
regional manager visited several of his restaurants and told 
him, "They're too many blacks in here." This sort of "smoking 
gun" evidence of discrimination is highly unusual. You seldom 
learn of such intentional discrimination because somebody has 
to tell you what went on and they rarely do. But the manager 
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who walked into our office reported being told there were "too 
many blacks." And the manager said, "Well, look, I am just 
hiring the people best qualified for the position based on the 
applicant pool that comes in the door. I've got the vacancies, so 
I'm hiring." But the regional manager said, "Well, do some-
thing about it." Two months later the regional manager came 
back and nothing had been done about it. The composition of 
his work force was the same. And so the local manager was 
fired and he came to the Legal Defense Fund. When he walked 
in the door, I had him come into the conference room and sit 
down in front of two lawyers. We took that case. And I'm hap-
py to report that that restaurant manager will never have to 
work anywhere else ever again. Last I heard he was on a boat 
somewhere off of Florida. He doesn't have to worry about any-
thing any more. 
Before we discuss the question of affirmative action gener-
ally, I want you to know that we have an affirmative action 
plan at the Legal Defense Fund. We've got to make sure that 
our mix of lawyers is just that, a racially diverse, culturally 
diverse group. How can we in good faith fight to defend affir-
mative action if we don't embrace diversity ourselves? This is 
very important. The head of our office in Los Angeles is Asian-
American; he's been with LDF over 20 years. The head of our 
office in Washington D.C. is a white woman. We have a staff of 
approximately 30 lawyers and, out of those 30, we have about 
14 or 15 African Americans and then the rest are a mix of 
white, Hispanic, and Asian-American attorneys, both men and 
women. I keep that in mind when I'm doing my hiring because 
it's important, it adds value, it makes us a better civil rights 
law firm; There are lots of people out there who have the abili-
ty and talent to work with us, but decisions have to be made 
not only in terms of what a person brings with them and their 
experience, but also what they will add at any giyen point to 
the organization. We're not talking about a question of qualifi-
cations - all of our candidates are highly qualified. When you 
look at the whole question of affirmative action, qualifications 
really shouldn't come into play because affirmative action only 
concerns selection from among persons who have the necessary 
qualifications. This basic fact is frequently misunderstood. 
I think about my admission to the University of Virginia 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/4
1997] SYMPOSIUM ON RACE RELATIONS 303 
Law School. They still had not had a single black woman stu-
dent as of 1967. The reason I made it through Virginia was 
because I had just come from a stint in the Peace Corps in 
Turkey. I went from one foreign country to another. When I 
arrived that was my approach. One thing we forget is that the 
University too had to do some things differently when I ar-
rived. Most of the Southern states had had a policy of exclud-
ing African Americans. As a matter of law, if an African Amer-
ican qualified to go to the state university, the state would pay 
his or her tuition to go to school out of state rather than admit 
him or her to the segregated state university. That happened 
up until 1967. Take the case of Patricia King, who today is a 
distinguished law professor at Georgetown. I understand that 
my homegirl applied to UV A while I was still in the Peace 
Corps. She was a couple of years ahead of me, and I under-
stand they would not admit her. Instead, Virginia paid her 
tuition at Harvard. So from Turkey I said, I'm going to apply 
to Virginia - and perhaps end up at Harvard. But Virginia 
fooled me: they said yes and admitted me. 
I was fully qualified but there were many other similarly 
qualified applicants, the majority of them white. UV A could 
have continued to fill its class several times over just with 
white men, as it had done for many years. However, the uni-
versity decided, "Well, we have been affirmatively excluding 
and discriminating for all these many years. It's time for us to 
do business differently." That's all affirmative action is. 
As I think about what I have been asked to speak to you 
about - the civil rights laws and where we are - I see them 
as furthering the work of the founding fathers. When they 
came together in Philadelphia in May, 1787, they came from 
allover. Some were sober, some were not sober. Luther Mar-
tin, the Attorney General of Maryland fell off his horse - they 
don't tell us about that. Thomas Jefferson wasn't there. Every-
one thinks he must have been since he wrote the Declaration 
of Independence; but he was not there at the Grand Conven-
tion. There were a total of 55 men. At that time there were 
three million people in the United States. Those in Philadel-
phia were the people who were propertied. They could have 
debated the issues in Latin as well as in English. They had . 
rich and varied backgrounds. But they were all on one societal 
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level. We know what the country was like then. There were 
three million people, slavery was at its height, women were 
glued to the pedestal, and the Indians had no rights either. 
There was a woman who tried to make a difference. We 
read in the history books about Abigail Adams, how she wrote 
to John, her husband. Abigail was the wife of the second Presi-
dent of the United States, John Adams, and mother of the 
sixth, John Quincy Adams. But Abigail wrote John and she 
said, "John, don't leave the ladies out of this grand code of' 
laws you're putting together. Please remember the ladies." And 
John wrote back and said "We knew the Indians were upset 
and we know the slaves were upset, but never did we know 
that a tribe more numerous than all of the others had grown 
upset." And she said, "Well, if you exclude us, we will throw 
your laws at your feet." They had a long marriage, but John 
did not listen. So when the founding fathers put together the 
Constitution and the preamble of the Constitution, what were 
the first three words? We the People. We the People. We the 
People was very narrowly defined. It did not include most of us 
in this room. If you were black, you were considered property. 
When they referred to property in their original Constitution, 
they were really talking about slaves most of the time. As for 
women, although the original document didn't say so explicitly, 
by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, inserting 
the word "male" into the Constitution for the first time, it was 
clear what was going on. We the People was a wonderful con-
cept and the founding fathers had the right terminology. They 
knew what they were supposed to be doing, but they didn't 
quite do it. 
They gave us a Constitution which could be amended. 
They gave us a wonderfully concise document and it's one of 
the finest ever crafted. But what saved us has been the amend-
ing process. More of us have been excluded than included. And 
, so, what is it our job to do? It's to finish putting the "We" into 
"We the People." When someone asks me about the civil rights 
laws, I explain that what we're trying to do is make the "We" 
inclusive. We do it in fits and starts as a society. Sometimes 
we get on the right track and we' almost make it, and then we 
turn around and we start back. But whenever they use it for 
political purposes, when politics comes in and intervenes, 
8
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almost inevitably it is in a very negative way. 
Let me give an example involving a current civil rights 
issue. A fight for the survival of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
is being waged in the courts as we stand here today. December 
5, 1995, was the shootout at the OK Corral at the· Supreme 
Court of the United States. The Legal Defense Fund was up 
there and had the Court all morning in companion cases from 
Texas and North Carolina. The Court had to provide an addi-
tional half hour for each argument. We went on all morning. 
Then we broke for lunch and came back and went at it again. 
At one point, Justice Scalia said to one of the lawyers arguing 
for the Legal Defense Fund, "What is it that you people want?" 
To which, the lawyer responded, "We want what you want" -
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in American de-
mocracy. 
The popular media would have us think that blacks want 
to be treated differently from other groups in the political pro-
cess. They say it's totally unnecessary and unfair to have the 
funny shaped districts. They would have you think that these 
funny shaped districts are all black and brown districts. Let 
me tell you a secret. Most districts are funny shaped and 
they're drawn funny shaped in order to protect incumbents. 
Republicans look after Democrats and Democrats look after 
Republicans- in the state houses when they go down to the 
basement to draw their lines. Keep that in mind. 
After the Civil War, it was necessary to amend the Consti-
. tution in order to end slavery and extend full rights to African 
Americans. Although Lincoln had issued the Emancipation 
Proclamation, it took the Thirteenth Amendment to outlaw 
slavery forever. Three years later, the Fourteenth Amendment 
made the newly freed slaves citizens and granted them the 
right to the equal protection of the laws. But African Ameri-
cans still didn't have the right to vote until passage of the 
Fifteenth Amendment two years later in 1870. 
These constitutional rights, they're wonderful to talk about 
and read, but they don't really have meaning and vitality until 
they are enforced and interpreted so that they include us. The 
federal courts' recent rulings interpreting the Fourteenth 
9
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Amendment to limit affirmative action are therefore particu-
larly ironic. These decisions turn the Constitution on its head 
since the Fourteenth Amendment was passed by an affirmative 
action Congress. The Thirty-Ninth Congress of the United 
State was an affirmative action Congress. That was the post-
Civil War Congress - the Congress that set up Howard Uni-
versity and the Freedmen's Bureau. Charles Sumner the great 
liberal senator from Massachusetts, was dying. That's why 
that amendment got passed. And to say now that the amend-
ment inhibits full inclusion of African Americans is, on its face, 
ahistorical. 
Let's turn next to the Fifteenth Amendment. Everyone is 
supposed to have the right to vote. We were all so proud last 
year when South Africa got the right to vote. And people stood 
in line for hours and hours waiting patiently to vote. We 
thought it was wonderful. That's not just South Africa. That 
happened here in this country in 1870 when black males got 
the right to vote. Now, black women didn't get it. No women 
could vote, and there was a big fight then because Congress 
was willing to give the vote to African-American men, but not 
to all women. Women got to vote 50 years later. Black and 
white, brown and yellow, together. Sojourner Truth had some 
decisions to make: "I'm black, I'm a woman, where do I go?" 
And so she and Frederick Douglass had to have some long 
conversations over that, which they did. 
Black men were first permitted to vote in 1870 - these 
were the newly freed slaves, most of whom were in the South. 
They voted freely from 1870 to 1890. During that period, Con-
gress for the first time become desegregated and nearly 40 
blacks were elected. We made progress, but what happened? 
We then took several steps back. We said, "Wait a minute. We 
adopted that Fifteenth Amendment but we really didn't mean 
for it to work this well." And so what happened was that be-
tween 1890 and 1900, many state constitutions were amended 
to put restrictions on the right to vote. That's when they came 
up with the poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses. 
The purpose and effect of these measures was, of course, to 
deny the vote to African Americans. By 1900, most of the Afri-
can-American (male) voters who had been granted the vote 
during Reconstruction were once again disenfranchised. In 
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1901, the last black to leave the Congress, George Henry 
White from North Carolina, stood up on the floor of the House 
of Representatives and said, "You have excluded us. You have 
taken away the right to vote and so I'm the last one to leave. 
But, we too, are a part of this democracy and we shall rise 
again like the Phoenix." That was 1901. 
When did the next African American come to the Congress 
from one of the states of the old Confederacy? Not until seven-
ty-one years later with Barbara Jordan from Texas. As we 
stand here now, of the 36 million African Americans in this 
country, a third are located in the South, 12 million. From 
1901 to 1972, no blacks served in Congress from the South. 
But then Barbara Jordan (from Texas) and Andy Young (from 
Georgia) arrived together in 1972. Now, why? Because the 
Voting Rights Act had been passed in 1965. Whenever a civil 
rights law passes, it's never enforced right away. It's nearly al-
ways tested first in the Supreme Court. So the Voting Rights 
Act went up to the Supreme Court. It took two or three years 
to get to the Court and for the Court to hold it constitutional. 
And then we saw its effects for the first time in the 1970 redis-
tricting. But progress was still in fits and starts. It was the 
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act that put real teeth 
into the law. And those amendments too went up to the Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court reviewed them in Thornburg 
v. Gingles" in 1986 and held them valid. That was 1986. 1990 
was our first redistricting pursuant to the 1982 amendments to 
the Voting Rights Act. The first elections under the 1990 redis-
tricting were in 1992, because the census was in 1990. What 
happened? Forty African Americans came to the Congress. 
This was the first time we had had that number since the 
1870s and 1880s. Folks come in from the deep South for the 
first time this century. Eva Clayton and Mel Watt were elected 
from North Carolina. Cynthia McKinney and Sanford Bishop 
came from Georgia - John Lewis had been there from Atlan-
ta, but two more were added. From Texas there was a new 
Hispanic legislator. In Barbara Jordan's old district, her suc-
cessor, Mickey Leland, died and was replaced by Sheila Jack-
son Lee. They also added Cleo Fields from Louisiana. 
4. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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Now what happens? When that election takes place, it's 
almost as if it's a repeat of what happened in 1890. We say oh, 
oh, all of these black people. You know, we mean for the laws 
to work but, my goodness, we don't mean for all of this. So 
what do youdo? At that point now, we challenge the Voting 
Rights Act. 
Studies have shown and courts have found that racially 
polarized voting is sadly pervasive throughout much of our 
nation. Regrettably, whites all too often will not vote for a 
person of color. Because of this unfortunate reality, majority-
minority districts are the sole means by which we have been 
able to achieve a truly desegregated Congress. And if we lose 
the voting rights cases that we argued in the High Court last 
December,6 I'm afraid the day may arrive when the members 
of the Congressional Black Caucus will be able to fit into the 
back seat of a taxicab. 
So, we have got to under~tand the interrelationship of 
these issues. In all parts of the country, you don't need the 
same remedies. But you do need remedies when unfair racial 
block voting consistently prevails in a region. The Voting 
Rights Act is an issue across the country and not just with 
respect to federal elective offices, but also school boards, state 
legislatures, and city councils. 
America is a democracy. When race rears its ugly head, 
when African Americans, Hispanics, and other people of color 
cannot elect candidates of their choice because of entrenched, 
racially polarized voting, the Voting Rights Act kicks in. It's 
then and only then that it kicks in. We're in danger now of this 
Court saying that that Act runs afoul of the Constitution. 
They've been tinkering around with it for the last two years, 
trying to figure out what it is they want to say about this Act. 
Meanwhile, we are in jeopardy as a nation of suffering a major 
set-back in opportunities for people of color to have a meaning-
ful voice in our political system .. 
5. Editor's note: The voting rights cases referred to were decided by the Su-
preme Court on June 13, 1996. See Shaw v. Hunt, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996); Bush 
v. Vera, 135 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1996). 
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Let me now move on to affirmative action and the issue of 
scholarships for Mrican Americans and other historically ex-
cluded people of color at American universities.· The case is 
Podberesky v. Kirwan6 and it concerns the University of Mary-
land. If there has ever been a place that has discriminated on 
the basis of race and ethnicity, it's the University of Maryland. 
The institution has a sad history, which the University of 
Maryland acknowledges. Thurgood Marshall was denied ad-
mission to the University of Maryland, back in 1930. He at-
tended Howard University instead. After receiving his degree 
he then went on to sue the University of Maryland over its dis-
criminatory policies, in the case Maryland v. Murray. 7 De-
cades later in the 1970s, the situation for African Americans 
remained bleak in Maryland's public institutions of higher edu-
cation. The state was sued as part of the multi-state higher 
education desegregation litigation known as the Adams8 case. 
Maryland" had been recalcitrant. Finally, after Adams and a 
little pressure from what was then the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, the University of Maryland 
decided it needed to do something about its image after all of 
those years of excluding Mrican Americans. 
In 1979, Maryland adopted a scholarship program under 
which it would spend less than 1% of its overall scholarship 
monies to encourage high achieving Mrican-American young 
people to matriculate at the University of Maryland - less 
than 1%. The plan worked. Maryland started being competi-
tive. They had scholarship money available, and an institution 
that had had a clear history of exclusion had Mrican Ameri-
cans start coming and achieving. They started talking to others 
and the word got around: "It's not a bad place to come. Let's 
give it a chance.» 
Ironically, the very program that caused Maryland to 
"make progress was then challenged in court as being constitu-
tionally impermissible. The plaintiff said that race-based schol-
6. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). 
7. 169 Md. 478, 182 A 590 (1935). 
8. Adams II. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part and modified 
in part, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), dismissed sub nom. Women's 
Equity Action League II. Callazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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arships violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The judge who 
heard the case was a Reagan appointee, Judge Frederick Motz. 
And Judge Motz, after a six week trial, wrote one of the finest 
opinions that I have ever read. He went in with his mind open 
and listened to the facts: he was a judge. Isn't that nice - you 
run into those sometimes. I recommend to you his opinion.9 
The judge framed the question as whether a public univer-
sity, racially segregated by law for almost a century and ac-
tively resistant to integration for at least 20 years, after con-
fronting the injustice of· its past - whether that university 
may voluntarily seek to remedy the lingering present effects of 
that discrimination by spending 1% of its financial aid budget 
to provide scholarships to approximately 30 high achieving 
African-American students each year. He concluded, after 
looking at all of the evidence, that the program was necessary 
to remedy the present effects of past discrimination· and that it 
was narrowly tailored. He ended that opinion by saying that 
few issues are more philosophically divisive than the question 
of affirmative action. He said it strikes at our very souls as 
individuals and as a nation. It lays bare the conflict between 
our ideals and our history. He said the answers we give to it 
today cannot be cast in stone. All that we can ask of those 
entrusted with the responsibility of running our institutions, 
both public and private, is that they approach the issue intelli-
gently, sensitively and self-critically, without bias or self-inter-
est. He said that the University of Maryland at College Park 
had done that in establishing this modest scholarship program 
as part of its commitment to erasing the vestiges of its past 
discrimination. And its judgment withstands the scrutiny to 
which the Constitution properly subjects it. 
Judge Motz's decision was appealed to the Fourth Circuit 
and a very conservative panel just threw the program out. 
They paid no attention to the judge's findings of fact or to the 
history of discrimination, saying simply that it was too long 
ago and that there was no compelling interest to justify action 
taken today. They ignored the findings of fact and disposed of 
the case, and the Supreme Court denied review. 
9. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Md. 1993), rev'd, 38 F.3d 
147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). 
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Viewing the court's decision in its real world context fur-
ther illustrates how deeply troubling it is. As a society we 
spend $75,000 a year for an inmate in solitary confinement. 
We spend $20,000 a year for an inmate in the general prison 
population, eating three meals a day, watching television. This 
scholarship is $4,000 a year for high-achieving Mrican-Ameri-
can kids. Now, something's wrong. We take a few steps for-
ward, we take so many back. 
Let's now turn to the proposed California Civil Rights 
Initiative (CCRI). What this law would do to California state 
law in terms of the rights, not only of minorities, but of women 
too is simply unconscionable. Unlike the federal Constitution 
which is still read as subjecting gender-based discrimination 
only to a form of intermediate scrutiny, the California Consti-
tution currently affords women broader protection, subjecting 
gender-based discrimination to strict scrutiny. CCRI would 
strip California's women of this important protection. If you 
look at the language of the initiative, it says "nothing in this 
section should be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifica-
tions based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of public employment, public education or public 
contracting." In other words, a reasonable basis is all that 
would be necessary to justify gender-based exclusions. It re-
peals the California Equal Rights Amendment protections as 
they have been construed by the California Supreme Court 
since 197110 and women will be lucky to have the protection 
of a rational basis standard if this initiative is passed. It's as 
broad as anything that I've ever seen. Not once does it mention 
the words affirmative action - which shows that they had a 
good public relations person putting it together. Instead, it 
talks about preferential treatment and preferential treatment 
gets everybody up in arms. But what they're really talking 
about is ending affirmative action because that would be the 
effect and impact of the legislation. 
When you look at how women, as well as minorities, have 
been able to move forward, not in giant steps, but making 
modest but real progress, I would hate to see California be-
10. See Cal. Const., art I, § 8; SaU'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 
529 (1971). 
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come like Louisiana. California should not be in the same boat 
at Louisiana, where the state Supreme Court just handed 
down a decision that essentially outlaws all types of affirma-
tive action by the state and by local governments. 11 
There are a lot of issues - the whole issue of environmen-
tal justice and what it does to people of color and to poor peo-
ple. As you know all too well, there is no statute that allows us 
to go to court to challenge the many forms of discrimination 
that are based not on race or ethnicity but simply on poverty. 
You've got to base challenges in terms of gender or ethnicity or 
race or disability or age because those are the categories that 
are protected. Concerning environmental justice, they're dump-
ing toxic waste in black and brown communities. And there is 
so much red-lining by banks and insurance companies. It's 
unconscionable. You can't get a mortgage to buy a house be-
cause you can't get the insurance - it destabilizes the neigh-
borhood. You can't get the insurance to start a business in the 
inner city so workers there are forced to look for work in the 
suburbs - although there too, like everywhere, all too many 
new jobs pay only minimum wage. Then there's a circle drawn 
around the inner city and you have transportation problems. 
The bus won't stop there; the transportation system is inade-
quate. That's what's going on now in Los Angeles. Bus fares 
are going through the roof, with the result that black and 
brown people who rely on public transportation are subsidizing 
the cost of a shiny new massive rail system that serves a group 
of commuters that is overwhelmingly wealthy, white, and sub-
urban. These are basic issues about what kind of society we 
are going to become. 
You've been very patient with me and I want to leave you 
with the words of Thurgood Marshall, who said, "You know, 
they called us agitators. But what is an agitator? That's the 
thing in the washing machine that gets the dirt out." We must 
keep on agitating. Thank you very much. 
11. See Louisiana Assoc. Gen'l Contractors, Inc. II. La., 669 So. 2d 1185 (La. 
1996). 
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